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Abstract Distraction is an emotion regulation strategy that
has an ambiguous status within cognitive-behavior therapy.
According to some treatment protocols it is counterproduc-
tive, whereas according to other protocols it is seen as a quite
useful strategy. The main purpose of the present study was to
test the hypothesis that distraction is adaptive when combined
with active acceptance, but maladaptive when combined with
avoidant strategies. A non-clinical community sample of
adults (N = 638) and a clinical sample (N = 172) completed
measures of emotion regulation and well-being. Hierarchical
cluster analysis was used to identify subgroups with different
profiles on six emotion regulation variables, and these sub-
groups were then compared on well-being (positive and neg-
ative emotionality, and life quality) and on clinical status. A
nine-cluster solution was chosen on the basis of explained
variance and homogeneity coefficients. Two of these clusters
had almost identical scores on distraction, but showed other-
wise very different profiles (distraction combined with accep-
tance vs. distraction combined with avoidance). The
distraction-acceptance cluster scored significantly higher than
the distraction-avoidance cluster on all measures of well-
being; it was also under-represented in the clinical sample,
whereas the distraction-avoidance cluster was over-represent-
ed. Limitations include a cross-sectional design, and use of
self-report measures. The findings suggest that distraction
may be either adaptive or maladaptive, depending on whether
it is combined with an attitude of acceptance or avoidance.
Keywords Distraction . Acceptance . Avoidance . Emotion
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Difficulties in emotion regulation are increasingly being in-
corporated into models of psychopathology, and are the direct
target of treatment interventions in several recent treatment
protocols (Gratz and Tull 2011; Barlow et al. 2011; Berking
et al. 2008; Linehan 1993a; Lynch et al. 2007).
An important question in this area concerns the usefulness
of strategies focusing on changing versus accepting emotional
experiences (e.g. Hayes et al. 1999; Mathews 2006; Clark
1999; Arch and Craske 2008; Hayes 2008; Hofmann and
Asmundson 2008). On the one hand, models emphasizing
the value of cognitive change strategies are consistent with
evidence that the emotional reactions of humans depend to a
considerable extent on the way situations or experiences are
cognitively construed or interpreted (e.g. Murphy and Zajonc
1993; LeDoux 1993; Russel 2003). From the perspective of
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al.
1999) on the other hand, efforts to change or otherwise control
emotions or thoughts run the risk of maintaining an inner
struggle with these events (Hayes 2008), that leads to suffer-
ing and impaired functioning (Hayes et al. 1999). Instead, in
ACT, the focus is on learning to observe and accept dysfunc-
tional emotional experiences, in order to become free of this
inner struggle.
An important part of the theoretical discussion regarding
the relative value of cognitive change and acceptance strate-
gies concern how these approaches or concepts relate to each
other. In the discussion regarding these matters, some writers
have proposed that acceptance and cognitive change strategies
show considerable similarities and achieve similar outcomes
(Arch and Craske 2008), whereas others see them as distinct
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strategies or approaches that are mutually exclusive
(Blackledge and Hayes 2001), and still others view them as
different but compatible forms of emotion regulation interven-
ing at different points in the emotion generating process
(Hofmann and Asmundson 2008).
In a previous study, Wolgast et al. (2012) explored the
constructs of cognitive restructuring and acceptance by using
items from well-established measures of these respective con-
structs in order to identify subcategories or conceptual nu-
ances in this area. Exploratory factor analyses in a non-
clinical sample resulted in a six-factor solution. Three of these
factors (BActive Acceptance^, BThought Avoidance^ and
BResignation^) loaded on a higher order factor of
BAcceptance^, whereas three other factors (BConstructive
Refocusing^, BCognitive Reappraisal^ and BDistractive
Refocusing^) loaded on a higher order factor of BCognitive
Restructuring^. The factors are described further below in the
Bmethods^ section. Interestingly, BActive Acceptance^ also
loaded significantly on the BCognitive Restructuring^ factor,
whereas BConstructive Refocusing^ also loaded on the
BAcceptance^ factor. This factor structure was validated by
confirmatory factor analyses in another non-clinical sample
and in a clinical sample. In sum, these findings indicate that
acceptance and cognitive restructuring should not be regarded
as unitary and non-related constructs, but rather as partly over-
lapping general dimensions of emotion regulation consisting
of several sub-constructs.
In studying these six emotion regulation factors for their
associations with well-being (positive and negative emotion-
ality, life quality, and clinical status), Wolgast et al. (2012)
found that Constructive Refocusing was most consistently
positively associated with aspects of well-being, but that also
Active Acceptance and Cognitive Reappraisal showed posi-
tive associations of this kind. Thought Avoidance and
Resignation, as expected, showed consistent negative associ-
ations with all aspects of well-being. The strategy of
Distractive Refocusing, however, stood out as not showing
any significant associations with positive or negative emotion-
ality, or with life quality, and showing only a weak association
with clinical status (the non-clinical group using more distrac-
tive refocusing than the clinical group).
These results with regard to Distractive Refocusing are
interesting in view of the ambiguous status of distraction strat-
egies within cognitive behavioral therapies. In some proto-
cols, distraction is seen as counter-productive (e.g. Craske
and Barlow 2008). In other protocols, however, as for exam-
ple in Dialectic Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan 1993a) and
in Gratz’ (Gratz and Tull 2011) Emotion Regulation Group
Treatment (ERGT), distraction is taught as a valid strategy for
regulating aversive emotions. One possibility is that distrac-
tion is adaptive in some contexts, and maladaptive in others. If
so, this might also explain the weak associations between
Distractive Refocusing and well-being in our previous study
(Wolgast et al. 2012), when measured as a variable averaged
over different context, based on questions about what the re-
spondents generally do or think when faced with aversive
emotions. An alternative possible explanation for these weak
associations, however, is that Distractive Refocusing simply
represents an emotion regulation strategy that is neither par-
ticularly effective nor maladaptive.
In connection to this, it is interesting to note that when
distraction is taught in DBT (Linehan 1993b) or ERGT
(Gratz 2010), it is done in a context which strongly empha-
sizes the importance of acceptance and willingness in relation
to aversive experiences. For example, as Linehan (1993b)
teaches distraction to clients, it is done as an example of a
distress tolerance skill that may be important for survival in
situations of crisis. As Gratz (2010) describes it, distraction
involves redirecting attention towards something else for a
short period of time, and is therefore quite compatible with a
willingness to come into contact with the avoided emotion in
the near future. As she puts it, if distraction is used in this way,
it can be a useful strategy for taking the edge off painful
emotions.
This suggests the hypothesis that distraction is an adaptive
strategy if it is used in the context of an accepting attitude to
painful emotions, whereas it is maladaptive if used in the
context of experiential avoidance. That is, distraction would
be adaptive if it is only a matter of temporarily redirecting
one’s attention toward something else for a short period of
time, with the intention of getting back into contact with that
emotion or the challenging situation in the near future. On the
other hand, if distraction is used as part of a generally avoidant
strategy, it is likely to bemaladaptive. Themain purpose of the
present study was to test this hypothesis by comparing the
well-being of (1) individuals who use distraction in combina-
tion with acceptance and (2) individuals who use distraction in
combination with experiential avoidance. To test this hypoth-
esis, we used a person-oriented approach to reanalyze the data
that were analyzed by a variable-oriented approach in the
study by Wolgast et al. (2012), which we believe is justified
given that we use an entirely different approach to data anal-
ysis, test distinctly different hypotheses and present complete-
ly novel results compared to the previous study.
A general limitation of the kind of variable-oriented ap-
proach that was used in the previous study is that it tells us
nothing about how different strategies are combined at the
level of the individual. This issue is of theoretical importance,
among other things, because it bears on the question of wheth-
er different strategies (e.g., cognitive restructuring strategies
and acceptance strategies) are readily combined or contradic-
tory. In addition, by identifying subgroups of individual who
share the same profile of scores on the emotion regulation
variables we may not only see how these different strategies
are combined in different individuals and how frequent such
combinations are, but also how these different profiles or
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patterns relate to measures of psychological well-being. A
second purpose of the present study was therefore to explore
these issues more generally, by contrasting alternative hypoth-
eses about the effects of combining acceptance and cognitive
restructuring strategies, and the effects of lacking these emo-
tion regulation strategies.
Based on the theoretical discussion summarized above, we
expected to find one subgroup of individuals who rely on
acceptance strategies but not on cognitive restructuring, an-
other subgroup of individuals who rely on cognitive
restructuring but not on acceptance, and a third subgroup of
individuals who use both cognitive restructuring and accep-
tance. As to their association with psychological well-being,
we may contrast three hypotheses: (1) The equifinality
hypothesis: If acceptance and cognitive change strategies rep-
resent strategies with considerable similarities that achieve
similar outcomes ( e.g., Arch and Craske 2008), all three sub-
groups should be equally high on psychological well-being,
and be overrepresented in the non-clinical sample. (2) The
additive/interactive hypothesis: If acceptance and cognitive
restructuring are different but compatible forms of emotion
regulation intervening at different points in the emotion gen-
erative process (e.g., Hofmann and Asmundson 2008), the
effects of these different strategies may be expected to add
or interact positively so that the subgroup of individuals who
are high on both would score higher than those who are high
on only one of these strategies. (3) The Bacceptance-is-
essential^ hypothesis: If acceptance is an underlying function-
al dimension that is basic to all adaptive strategies of emotion
regulation (Blackledge and Hayes 2001; Boulanger et al.
2010), subgroups who score generally high on acceptance
should show the highest psychological well-being, regardless
of their scores on cognitive restructuring.
Similarly, at the other end of the scale, we might expect to
find one subgroup of individuals who score generally low on
acceptance but not on cognitive restructuring, another sub-
group of individuals who score generally low on cognitive
restructuring but not on acceptance, and a third subgroup with
low scores on both cognitive restructuring and acceptance.
Again, alternative hypotheses may be contrasted: (1) The
Bno-strategies-is-worst^ hypothesis: If both acceptance and
cognitive change strategies are adaptive strategies, a subgroup
with low scores on both of these strategies should be worst off
in terms of psychological well-being. (2) The Bacceptance-is-
essential^ hypothesis: If acceptance is an underlying function-
al dimension that is basic to all adaptive strategies of emotion
regulation (Blackledge and Hayes 2001; Boulanger et al.
2010), individuals who score generally low on acceptance
should be worst off, whether they score low on cognitive
restructuring or not.
To summarize, the present research had two purposes. The
first purpose was to test the hypothesis that the use of distrac-
tive strategies is adaptive when combined with acceptance,
and maladaptive when combined with avoidance. The second
purpose was to compare alternative hypotheses with regard to
the how strategies related to cognitive restructuring and ac-
ceptance may be combined, as well as how different combi-
nations relate to measures of psychological well-being. In or-
der to test these hypotheses we used a person oriented ap-
proach to data analysis which means that we studied if it
was possible to identify groups of individuals with similar
profiles of scores across the studied variables and examine




Informed consent was obtained from all individual partici-
pants included in the study.
Non-Clinical Sample A non-clinical sample of 1500 individ-
uals (aged 18-70) was drawn randomly from the SPAR regis-
ter (the Swedish government´ Person and Address Register),
and were sent a letter with a questionnaire and a pre-stamped
addressed return envelope. Of these, 638 individuals (364
women and 274 men, response rate 42 %) filled out the entire
questionnaire and returned it. The letter also included infor-
mation regarding the study as well as the measures.
Participation was anonymous and no information was stored
that could identify a specific participant. In addition to the
measures to be used in the study, the participants were asked
to state their gender, age and level of highest completed
education.
Clinical Sample Participants in the clinical sample (N = 172)
were volunteers recruited among patients currently in treat-
ment in open psychiatric care in the county of Blekinge in
Sweden. In total 350 booklets containing an information letter
and all the measures were given to members of staff in open
psychiatric care, who in turn administered them to clients they
were in contact with. Of these 350 booklets, 172 were
returned, rendering a response rate of 49 %. Of the respon-
dents, 63 % were female and 37 % were male. There were no
formal exclusionary criteria to participate in the study and we
had nomeans of controlling whowere asked to participate and
who volunteered, nor their diagnosis and type of treatment.
The population from which the sample was drawn (patients
attending open psychiatric care in Blekinge during 2011) are
known to have the following characteristics: 43 % are male,
57 % are female and the most common diagnostic groups are
anxiety disorders (15 %), depressive disorders (14 %), schizo-
phrenia and other psychotic disorders (13 %), personality dis-
orders (9 %), bipolar disorder (7 %), neuropsychiatric
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disorders includingmental retardations (7%), substance abuse
(5 %) and post-traumatic stress disorder (5 %).
Measures
Strategies of Emotion Regulation To assess different types
of strategies we used the participants’ scores on scales based
on the factors identified in a previous study (Wolgast et al.
2012). There were three acceptance-related factors: Thought
Avoidance (14 items), which refers to active efforts to avoid
and suppress aversive cognitive material, Active Acceptance
(7 items), which represents a combination of experiential ac-
ceptance and behavioral flexibility in the face of aversive
emotions, and Resignation (4 items), which refers to passively
accepting a situation or an aversive emotional state combined
with an experience of not having the ability to do anything
about it. There were also three factors related to Cognitive
Restructuring: Cognitive Reappraisal (6 items), which refers
to the traditional concept of reappraisal (i.e. changing emo-
tional reactions by changing our appraisals of the emotion
eliciting stimulus or situation), Distractive Refocusing (6
items), which represents strategies aimed at trying to think
about something else, preferably something positive, entailing
an unwillingness to remain in cognitive contact with the emo-
tion eliciting stimulus or situation rather than to think differ-
ently about it, and finally Constructive Refocusing (12 items),
which refers to attempts to change not how we interpret the
topography of the situation (i.e. how we interpret the factual
characteristics of the events) but rather to reframe or reinter-
pret the function or consequence of the situation (e.g. what our
behavioral options are given what has happened, what we can
learn from the situation etc). All the scales showed adequate
levels of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alphas: Thought
Avoidance: .92, Active Acceptance: .75, Resignation: .73,
Cognitive Reappraisal: .84, Distractive Refocusing: .79,
Constructive Refocusing: .87).
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) To assess dis-
positional positive and negative emotionality participants
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson et al. 1988). The PANAS is a 20-item mood
adjective checklist designed to measure the Positive Affect
(PA) and Negative Affect (NA) factors and has shown satis-
factory psychometric properties in previous research (Watson
et al. 1988). To complete the PANAS, participants were
instructed to use a five-point Likert scale (1, very slightly or
not at all; 5, extremely) to indicate Bto what extent you gen-
erally feel this way, that is, how you feel on the average^ for
each adjective. The Swedish version of the scale showed ad-
equate internal consistency for both Positive Affect and
Negative Affect (Cronbach’s alphas: Positive Affect = .89;
Negative Affect = .92).
World Hea l th Organ i za t i on Qua l i t y o f L i f e
Assessment—Brief Version (WHOQOL-BREF) Quality
of life was assessed by the WHOQOL-BREF, developed
and validated by WHO in several studies (Skevington et al.
2004). It contains 26 items, the response (from least to most)
to each item being on a 5-point rating scale of a particular
aspect of quality of life. Besides the first two items of general
nature, the remaining 24 items of the instrument are known to
factorise into four domains of quality of life, denoted by
‘physical health’ (7 items, domain 1), ‘psychological’ (6
items, domain 2), ‘social relationships’ (3 items, domain 3),
and ‘environment’ (8 items, domain 4), respectively. The
Swedish version of the scale used in the present study showed
adequate internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .87).
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis
The individual participants were grouped into clusters on the
basis of their individual profiles of scores on the six scales
related to acceptance and cognitive restructuring. This was
done according to the LICUR procedure suggested by
Bergman (1998) and using the statistical package for
pattern-oriented analyses SLEIPNER 2.1 (Bergman and El-
Khouri 2002). In a first step, the data were searched for mul-
tivariate outliers, which led to the identification and removal
of one outlier. Secondly, clusters were formed using Ward’s
hierarchical clustering method, which is a stepwise procedure
that starts by considering each individual as a separate cluster
and then merges the two clusters that results in the smallest
increase in the overall error sum of squares in each subsequent











Elementary school 18.4 26.3
Gymnasium 47.0 53.4
University 34.6 20.3
M (SD) M (SD)




20.4 (7.6) 31.7 (7.8)
Positive emotionality
(PANAS-P)
35.2 (6.3) 26.1 (6.9)
Quality of Life
(WHOQOL)
98.0 (15.3) 72.9 (15.8)
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step. In order to determine the optimal cluster solution we
used the criteria suggested by Bergman (1998): (1) The cluster
solution should be theoretically meaningful. (2) If a distinct
reduction in the explained variance occurs when moving from
one step to another, this may indicate that two not so similar
clusters have been merged and that the resulting cluster solu-
tion is not optimal. (3) The number of clusters should not be
expected to be less than five or to exceed fifteen. (4) The size
of the explained variance for the chosen cluster solution
should at the very least exceed 50 %, and preferably exceed
67%. Additionally, the homogeneity coefficients of each clus-
ter should preferably be <1.0. In a third step, a data simulation
using Monte Carlo procedure with 20 re-samplings was per-
formed to test if the explained variance for the identified clus-
ter solution significantly exceeded what would be expected
from a random data set with the same general properties as
the Breal^ data set. In a final step, in order to improve the
homogeneity of the clusters and to increase the proportion of
explained variance, a non-hierarchical relocation procedure
was performed (Bergman 1998), in which individuals were
moved between clusters in order to find the optimal solution.
After removing an outlier identified by the residue proce-
dure in SLEIPNER 2.1 (Bergman and El-Khouri 2002), 809
individuals were left for further analyses using Ward’s hierar-
chical clustering method. Applying the criteria suggested by
Bergman (1998) resulted in the choice of a 9-cluster solution,
which explained 59.9 % of the variance, whereas the 8 cluster
solution would have resulted in a drop in explained variance to
57.1 %. The data simulation reliably showed that the ex-
plained variance for the chosen cluster solution was signifi-
cantly higher than what would be expected by chance
(p < .01). After this, the relocation procedure was performed,
resulting in a final nine cluster solution which explained
62.6 % of the variance and where all the clusters except one
had homogeneity coefficients of <1.0 (cluster 5 had a homo-
geneity coefficient of 1.08).
Results
First, descriptive data is presented on the two samples. Then
the results of the cluster analysis are described, and the clusters
Table 2 Bivariate correlations
(Pearson’s) between all self-report













PANAS P –.53* .65* –.54* .51* –.56* .57* .51* .45*
PANAS N –.69* .68* –.58* .65* –.42* –.26* –.20*
WHOQOL –.65* .62* –.63* .52* .37* .23*
Thought
Av.
-.58* .64* –.35* –.11* –.09*
Active
Acc.
–.46* .49* .34* .26*





* p < .001
Table 3 The nine-cluster



















1 104 34.0 (8.8) 21.6 (2.7) 6.7 (1.6) 30.7 (7.6) 19.0 (6.1) 10.5 (2.6)
2 108 40.1 (10.9) 21.0 (2.5) 7.1 (1.9) 43.4 (4.3) 33.7 (4.3) 15.1 (2.8)
3 62 67.3 (8.31) 16.2 (2.7) 10.2 (2.0) 36.7 (6.8) 29.0 (4.4) 19.8 (3.2)
4 83 46.4 (9.0) 14.0 (2.5) 7.4 (1.8) 27.8 (6.3) 23.5 (5.0) 14.6 (2.8)
5 94 45.8 (8.9) 21.8 (2.9) 9.9 (3.1) 37.9 (6.5) 27.2 (6.8) 19.7 (2.9)
6 48 75.7 (6.8) 14.2 (3.5) 16.0 (2.0) 28.9 (6.7) 27.5 (4.7) 13.6 (2.7)
7 87 73.2 (6.7) 10.6 (3.1) 14.6 (2.1) 21.2 (7.2) 15.9 (5.0) 9.5 (2.1)
8 112 55.9 (9.1) 18.9 (2.7) 9.1 (2.0) 35.9 (5.5) 28.0 (4.5) 12.1 (1.9)
9 111 61.7 (7.6) 15.0 (2.7) 11.1 (1.8) 22.6 (3.8) 21.3 (5.3) 11.7 (2.4)
All 809 53.5 (15.9) 17.4 (4.7) 9.8 (3.5) 31.9 (9.5) 24.8 (7.5) 13.8 (4.3)
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are compared on positive and negative emotionality, life qual-
ity and clinical status. After that, the results are analyzed with
regard to the research questions: First the hypothesis on dis-
traction is tested. Second, the alternative hypotheses
concerning the combination of a high use, and low use, of
both acceptance and cognitive restructuring are compared.
Descriptive Data
Descriptive data on demographic and clinical variables for
the clinical and non-clinical samples are presented in
Table 1. On the demographic variables, the samples dif-
fered significantly with regard to age, t (808) = 4.54,
p < .01, and level of education, χ2 (2) = 11.4, p < .01, but
not with regard to gender, χ2 (1) = 1.54, p = .21. With
regard to positive and negative emotionality and quality
of life, the differences between the samples were signifi-
cant and large for all variables [PANAS-N: t (808) = 15.9,
p < .01, d = 1.1; PANAS-P: t (808) = -17.1, p < .01, d = -
1.2; Total WHOQOL: t (808) = 19.0, p < .01, d = 1.3].
The bivariate correlations between all self-report measures
are presented in Table 2.
Cluster Analysis
As stated above (see the section on hierarchical cluster
analysis), the clustering procedure resulted in a nine clus-
ter solution. Table 3 shows the means and standard devi-
ations on each factor for each cluster as well for the whole
group, whereas Fig. 1 displays the profile of z-scores
(cluster mean minus total group mean, divided by the
standard deviation of the total group) for each cluster on
the 6 factors.
Comparisons Between the Clusters on Well-Being
A one-way ANOVA with the nine clusters as independent
variable and age as dependent variable showed a signifi-
cant omnibus effect [F(8, 800) = 2.74, p < .01]. Tukey-
corrected post-hoc comparisons showed that the only sig-
nificant differences between the clusters were that Cluster
4 was older than Cluster 3 and Cluster 7. The gender
distribution did not differ significantly across the nine
clusters [χ2(8) = 13.9, p = .09]. With regard to level of
highest completed education, there was a significant om-
nibus effect, indicating that there were significant differ-
ences in the distribution across the clusters [χ2(16) = 46.2,
p < .01]. To further investigate this effect, the observed
frequency in each cell was compared with the frequency
expected if the educational level was randomly distributed
across the clusters. The statistical testing was performed
in accordance with the fixed-margins model using
EXACON (Bergman and El-Khouri 1987). After
adjusting the alpha level to allow for multiple compari-
sons using Bonferroni correction (critical α = .002; .05/
27) the analysis showed that the only significant effect
was that more participants in Cluster 2 had completed a
university level education than what was to be expected
by chance (observed frequency 54, expected frequency
34.2, χ2 = 11.5, p = .0008).
Three Bonferroni corrected (critical α’s = .017)
ANOVAs were performed with the nine clusters as inde-
pendent variables and scores on PANAS-N, PANAS-P
and WHOQOL as dependent variable in the separate
Fig. 1 Pattern of z-scores across the 6 factors for all clusters. TA thought
avoidance, R resignation, AA active acceptance, ConRef constructive
refocusing, CogRe cognitive reappraisal, DR distractive refocusing
Table 4 Comparisons between
the clusters on the PANAS-P Cluster N PANAS-P
M (SD)
Significant differences
(Sidak, α = .05)
2. Generally High Acceptance + High Cognitive
Restructuring (except Distractive Refocusing)
108 39.4 (3.8) > Clusters 4, 8, 3, 6, 9, 7
1. Generally High Acceptance + Low Cognitive
Restructuring (except Constructive Refocusing)
104 37.7 (4.4) > Clusters 8, 3, 6, 9, 7
5. High Distractive Refocusing + High Active Acceptance 94 37.1 (5.2) > Clusters 3, 6, 9, 7
4. Low Active Acceptance + Low Resignation 83 35.2 (5.4) > Clusters 6, 9, 7
8. Average profile (neither high nor low on any factor) 112 34.5 (6.6) > Clusters 6, 9, 7
3. High Distractive Refocusing + High Thought Avoidance 62 33.4 (6.4) > Clusters 6, 9, 7
6. Generally Low Acceptance + Average Cognitive
Restructuring
48 28.6 (6.8) > Cluster 7
9. Low Constructive Refocusing 111 27.8 (5.9) > Cluster 7
7. Generally Low Acceptance + Generally Low Cognitive
Restructuring
87 22.6 (6.2)
All 809 33.3 (7.7)
BHigh^: z > .70; BLow^: z < -.70
R
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analyses. To control for the observed differences between
the clusters with regard to age and level of highest com-
pleted education, these variables were entered as covari-
ates in the analyses. Means and standard deviations on the
criterion variables for each cluster are presented, in de-
scending order according to the mean score of the clus-
ters, in Tables 3, 4 and 5 (one table for each criterion
variable). The omnibus tests showed that there were sig-
nificant differences between the clusters on all three var-
iables [PANAS-P: F(8, 798) = 85.1, p < .01, partial
η2 = .46; PANAS-N: F(8798) = 116.9, p < .01, partial
η2 = .54; WHOQOL: F(8, 798) = 110.7, p < .01, partial
η2 = .53]. Sidak-corrected post hoc comparisons were per-
formed to examine the significance of the differences
between the clusters on each dependent variable. The re-
sults from these analyses are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5.
Representation of the Clusters in the Clinical
and non-Clinical Samples
To study the over- and under-representation of each clus-
ter in the clinical and non-clinical samples, the clusters
were cross-tabulated with the two samples. Table 7 shows
a comparison of the observed frequencies in each cell
with the frequencies expected if the clusters had been
randomly distributed across the samples. The statistical
testing was performed in accordance with the fixed-
Table 5 Comparisons between
the clusters on the PANAS-N Cluster N PANAS-
NM (SD)
Significant differences
(Sidak, α = .05)
7. Generally Low Acceptance + Generally Low Cognitive
Restructuring
87 35.8 (6.1) > Clusters 9, 3, 8, 4, 5, 1, 2
6. Generally Low Acceptance + Average Cognitive
Restructuring
48 34.9 (7.5) > Clusters 9, 3, 8, 4, 5, 1, 2
9. Low Constructive Refocusing 111 26.6 (6.2) > Clusters 8, 4, 5, 1, 2
3. High Distractive Refocusing + High Thought Avoidance 62 25.1 (8.7) > Clusters 8, 4, 5, 1, 2
8. Average profile (neither high nor low on any factor) 112 20.1 (6.0) > Clusters 1, 2
4. Low Active Acceptance + Low Resignation 83 19.8 (5.4) > Clusters 1, 2
5. High Distractive Refocusing + High Active Acceptance 94 19.1 (5.3) > Clusters 1, 2
1. Generally High Acceptance + Low Cognitive
Restructuring (except Constructive Refocusing)
104 16.4 (5.0)
2. Generally High Acceptance + High Cognitive
Restructuring (except Distractive Refocusing)
108 16.2 (5.0)
All 809 22.8 (8.9)
BHigh^: z > .70; BLow^: z < -.70
Table 6 Comparisons between





2. Generally High Acceptance + High Cognitive Restructuring
(except Distractive Refocusing)
108 107.2 (9.1) > Clusters 5, 8, 4,
3, 9, 6, 7
1. Generally High Acceptance + Low Cognitive Restructuring
(except Constructive Refocusing)
104 106.2 (9.7) > Clusters 8, 4, 3,
9, 6, 7
5. High Distractive Refocusing + High Active Acceptance 94 101.7 (14.0) > Clusters 3, 9, 6, 7
8. Average profile (neither high nor low on any factor) 112 98.0 (13.1) > Clusters 3, 9, 6, 7
4. Low Active Acceptance + Low Resignation 83 96.4 (16.1) > Clusters 9, 6, 7
3. High Distractive Refocusing + High Thought Avoidance 62 91.1 (15.9) > Clusters 9, 6, 7
9. Low Constructive Refocusing 111 79.8 (12.6) > Clusters 6, 7
6. Generally LowAcceptance + Average Cognitive Restructuring 48 72.0 (15.1)
7. Generally Low Acceptance + Generally Low Cognitive
Restructuring
87 67.3 (9.9)
All 809 92.7 (18.5)
BHigh^: z > .70; BLow^: z < -.70
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margins model using EXACON (Bergman and El-Khouri
1987).
The Adaptiveness and Maladaptiveness of Distractive
Refocusing
As seen in Table 3 and in Fig. 1, two clusters showed high
scores on Distractive Refocusing: cluster 3 and cluster 5.
These two clusters had almost exactly the same score on
Distractive Refocusing, but showed otherwise very different
profiles. Whereas Cluster 3 combined high scores on
Distractive Focusing with high scores on Thought
Avoidance, Cluster 5 combined high scores on Distractive
Refocusing with high scores on Active Acceptance.
According to the hypothesis, Cluster 5 should show higher
well-being than Cluster 3. This hypothesis was supported on
all four variables: Cluster 5 scored significantly higher than
Cluster 3 on positive emotionality (see Table 3), significantly
lower on negative emotionality (see Table 4), and significantly
higher on life quality (see Table 5). In addition, as seen in
Table 6, Cluster 5 was under-represented in the clinical sample
(observed frequency: 11, expected frequency: 20, χ2 = 4.0,
p < .05), whereas Cluster 3 was over-represented in the clini-
cal sample (observed frequency: 20, expected frequency: 13,
χ2 = 3.6, p < .05).
Combining High Use of Acceptance with High Use
of Cognitive Restructuring
As seen in Fig. 1, one of the clusters (Cluster 1) was charac-
terized by consistently high scores on acceptance and consis-
tently low scores on cognitive restructuring, and another
(Cluster 2) by consistently high scores on both acceptance
and cognitive restructuring. Interestingly, these two clusters
showed a very similar profile on the acceptance factors, but
differed widely on the cognitive restructuring factors. Still, as
seen in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, they did not differ significantly on
any of the indicators of well-being. Interestingly, although
both of these clusters were large (104 individuals in Cluster
1, and 108 individuals in Cluster 2), they were both complete-
ly unrepresented in the clinical sample – all 212 individuals
were from the non-clinical sample. This speaks against the
hypothesis that acceptance and cognitive restructuring have
an additive or interactive effect on well-being. The results
are, however, consistent with both of the other hypotheses –
that is, the equifinality hypothesis (i.e., acceptance and cogni-
tive change strategies achieve similar outcomes), and the
Bacceptance-is-essential hypothesis^. Unfortunately, the clus-
ter analysis did not identify any cluster with consistently high
scores on cognitive restructuring and consistently low scores
on acceptance – if so, it would have been possible to contrast
these two hypotheses.
Combining Low Use of Acceptance with Low Use
of Cognitive Restructuring
As seen in Fig. 1, one of the clusters (Cluster 6) was charac-
terized by consistently low scores specifically on acceptance
in combination with about average scores on cognitive
restructuring, whereas another cluster (cluster 7) showed con-
sistently low scores on both acceptance and cognitive
restructuring. Providing partial support for the Bno-strate-
gies-is-worse^ hypothesis, Cluster 7 scored significantly low-
er than Cluster 6 on positive emotionality (see Table 3).
However, there were no significant differences between the
clusters on negative emotionality (Table 5) or life quality
(Table 6), and both clusters showed similar over-
representat ion in the clinical sample and under-
representation in the non-clinical sample (see Table 7).
Discussion
The primary purpose of the present study was to test the hy-
pothesis that the use of distractive strategies is adaptive when
combined with acceptance, and maladaptive when combined
with avoidance. A secondary purpose was to compare alter-
native hypotheses with regard to the effects of combining high
use, and low use, respectively, of acceptance with high use of
cognitive restructuring strategies.
The study clearly supported the hypothesis that distractive
strategies are adaptive when combined with acceptance, and
maladaptive when combined with avoidance. This is interest-
ing in view of the ambiguous status of distraction strategies
within cognitive behavioral therapies, where distraction (e.g.,
Gratz 2010; Linehan 1993b) are taught as valid strategies for
regulating aversive emotions in some protocols, and are seen
as counter-productive in others (e.g. Craske and Barlow
2008). The results of the present study suggest that the
Table 7 Cross-tabulation of samples and clusters, comparing observed
and expected frequencies in each cell (expected frequencies in
parentheses)
Cluster Non-clinical sample (N = 637) Clinical sample (N = 172)
1 104 (82)** 0 (22)***
2 108 (85)** 0 (23)***
3 42 (49) 20 (13)*
4 73 (65) 10 (18)*
5 83 (74) 11 (20)*
6 26 (38)* 22 (10)***
7 23 (69)*** 64 (19)***
8 100 (88) 12 (24)**
9 78 (87) 33 (24)*
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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function of distraction strategies depend upon whether distrac-
tion is used primarily as a way of avoiding aversive experi-
ences, or used merely to redirect attention towards something
else for a short period of time, merely postponing one’s will-
ingness to enter into contact with the avoided emotion.
Methodologically, it may be noted that the hypothesis on
distraction could be tested because the cluster analysis resulted
in two clusters with almost equally high scores on Distractive
Refocusing, combined with almost opposite profiles on the
acceptance variables. The secondary hypotheses could not
be equally well tested because the cluster analysis did not
produce all cluster profiles required for this. In particular, al-
though the analysis produced one cluster with generally high
scores both on acceptance and cognitive restructuring strate-
gies, and another cluster with high scores on acceptance strat-
egies and low scores on cognitive restructuring strategies, no
cluster was found with generally high scores on cognitive
restructuring combined with low scores on acceptance strate-
gies. This means that, although the additive-interactive hy-
pothesis could be rejected (because the cluster with high
scores on both cognitive restructuring and acceptance was
not associated with higher well-being than the cluster with
high scores merely on acceptance), the results were consistent
with both of the other hypotheses – that is, the equifinality
hypothesis (i.e., acceptance and cognitive change strategies
achieve similar outcomes), and the Bacceptance-is-essential
hypothesis^.
There are important limitations to the present study that
should be taken into consideration when interpreting the
results. First, the study is based upon the factor structure
identified only in a previous study by the same authors
(Wolgast et al. 2012), and the present study makes use of
the same data as in the previous study. It remains to see
whether the results generalize to other populations.
Furthermore, the design is cross-sectional, which renders
causal conclusion regarding the relationship between the
examined strategies and the criterion variables impossible
to draw. As an example, we cannot know if a particular
profile of regulatory strategies leads to emotional distress
or whether it is high levels of emotional distress leads one
to adopt a particular approach to emotion regulation.
Furthermore, the study is based entirely upon data from
self-report questionnaires, which make the results suscep-
tible to threats from mono-method biases. A particular
limitation tied to the use of self-report measures is that
the validity of the data is dependent upon the degree to
which the participants are consciously aware of their ha-
bitual use of different strategies and traits. With this in
mind, a recommendation for future research would be to
study the different forms of distraction strategies experi-
mentally as well as to capture not only explicit, but also
implicit, automatic or unconscious distraction strategies. It
would also be interesting to study whether the effects of
distraction strategies varies depending on for example
what emotion or experience we distract ourselves from
and if you examine long term or short term consequences.
Despite these limitations, we believe that the present study
provides interesting empirical contributions to the ongoing
discussion regarding the role of distraction in emotion regula-
tion. It also illustrates the advantages of applying a person-
oriented approach to the study of emotion regulation which,
instead of focusing on variables, studies different ways of
combining several emotion regulatory strategies at the level
of the individual.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflicts of Interest Martin Wolgast and Lars-Gunnar Lundh declare
that they have no conflicts of interest to report.
Experiment Participants All participants have provided their in-
formed consent to participate in the study.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give ap-
propriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Arch, J. J., & Craske,M. G. (2008). Acceptance and commitment therapy
and cognitive behavioral therapy for anxiety disorders: different
treatments, similar mechanisms? Clinical Psychology: Science and
Practice, 15, 263–279.
Barlow, D. H., Farchione, T. J., Fairholme, C. P., Ellard, K. K., Boisseau,
C. L., Allen, L. B., & Ehrenreich-Way, J. (2011). Unified protocol
for transdiagnostic treatment of emotional disorder. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Bergman, L. R. (1998). A pattern-oriented approach to studying individ-
ual development: Snapshots and processes. In R. B. Cairns, L. R.
Bergman, & J. Kagan (Eds.). Methods and models for studying the
individual (pp. 82–31). Thousand Oaks
Bergman, L. R., & El-Khouri, B. M. (1987). EXACON: A fortran 77
program for the exact analysis of single cells in a contingency table.
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 47, 155–161.
Bergman, L. R., & El-Khouri, B. M. (2002). SLEIPNER. A statistical
package for pattern-oriented analyses. Version 2.1. Stockholm:
Stockholm University, Department of Psychology. www.psychol-
ogy.su.se/sleipner.
Berking, M., Wupperman, P., Reichardt, A., Pejic, T., Dippel, A., & Znoj,
H. (2008). Emotion-regulation skills as treatment targets in psycho-
therapy. Behavior Research and Therapy, 46, 1230–1237.
Blackledge, J. T., & Hayes, S. C. (2001). Emotion regulation in accep-
tance and commitment therapy. Clinical Psychology: Science and
Practice, 10, 161–165.
Boulanger, J. L., Hayes, S. C., & Pistorello, J. (2010). In A. M. Kring &
D. M. Sloan (Eds.), Emotion regulation and psychopathology (pp.
107–136). New York: Guilford Press.
126 J Psychopathol Behav Assess (2017) 39:117–127
Clark, D. M. (1999). Anxiety disorders: why they persist and how to treat
them. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 5–27.
Craske, M. G., & Barlow, D. H. (2008). Panic disorder and agoraphobia.
In D. H. Barlow (Ed.),Clinical handbook of psychological disorders
(4th ed., pp. 1–65). New York: Guilford Press.
Gratz, K. L. (2010). An acceptance-based emotion regulation group ther-
apy fordeliberate self-harm. Unpublished treatment manual.
Jackson: University of Mississippi Medical Center.
Gratz, K. L., & Tull, M. T. (2011). Extending research on the utility of an
adjunctive emotion regulation group therapy for deliberate self-harm
among women with borderline personality pathology. Personality
Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 2, 316–326.
Hayes, S. C. (2008). Climbing our hills: a beginning conversation on the
comparison of acceptance and commitment therapy and traditional
cognitive behavioral therapy. Clinical Psychology: Science and
Practice, 15, 286–295.
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and
commitment therapy: An experiential approach to behavior change.
New York: Guilford Press.
Hofmann, S. G., & Asmundson, G. J. (2008). Acceptance and
mindfulness-based therapy: new wave or old hat? Clinical
Psychology Review, 28, 1–16.
LeDoux, J. (1993). Emotional networks in the brain. In M. Lewis & J. M.
Haviland (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (pp. 109–118). New York:
Guilford Press.
Linehan, M. M. (1993a). Cognitive-behavioral treatment for borderline
personality disorder. New York: Guilford Press.
Linehan, M. M. (1993b). Skills training manual for treating borderline
personality disorder. New York: Guilford Publications.
Lynch, T. R., Trost, W. T., Salsman, N., & Linehan, M. M. (2007).
Dialectical behavior therapy for borderline personality disorder.
Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 3, 181–205.
Mathews, A. (2006). Towards an experimental cognitive science of CBT.
Behavior Therapy, 37, 314–318.
Murphy, S. T., & Zajonc, R. B. (1993). Affect, cognition, and
awareness: affective priming with optimal and suboptimal stim-
ulus exposures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
64, 723–739.
Russel, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction of
emotion. Psychological Review, 110, 145–172.
Skevington, S. M., Lotfy, M., & O’Connell, O. (2004). TheWorld Health
Organization’s WHOQOL-BREF quality of life assessment: psy-
chometric properties and results of the international field trial. a
report from the WHOQOL Group. Quality of Life Research, 13,
299–310.
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and
validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: the
PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
54, 1063–1070.
Wolgast, M., Lundh, L.-G., & Viborg, G. (2012). Cognitive
restructuring and acceptance: an empirically grounded concep-
tual analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research. doi:10.1007
/s10608-012-9477-0.
J Psychopathol Behav Assess (2017) 39:117–127 127
